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THE SOCIAL ASSISTANCE REVIEW COMMITTEE
Paula Rochman*
Social assistance has long been viewed as an essential income main-
tenance scheme for the truly poor and disadvantaged. Historically, in
Canada, a person in need of social assistance was referred to a local
charitable agency. As a result of the Great Depression, unemployment
and the inability to support oneself came no longer to be seen as mat-
ters of personal inadequacy. This lead to the development of a more
comprehensive program of social assistance over the next decades. In
the 1950s, the Old Age Security Act, the Blind Persons' Right Act, Disabled
Persons' Allowance Act and the first Unemployment Insurance Act were
passed.1 In 1966, the Canada Assistance Plan was enacted to allow for
comprehensive federal-provincial cost-sharing of provincially designed
social assistance programs.la
While the programs have made a difference from the times when one
was expected to rely on charity, many of the attitudes held by those in
positions of power about social assistance recipients have not. Accord-
ing to the National Council on Welfare:
"What is particularly problematic about this historical legacy is the
unquestioned assumption of negative attitudes toward people who,
Copyright * Paula Rochman. Paula Rochman is a graduate from Osgoode Hall
Law School in Downsview, Ontario. This paper was written for the Intensive Pro-
gram in Poverty Law and is published here as part of the special arrangement
which the Journal has with the program. As part of the program, students work at
Parkdale Community Legal Services in Toronto, Ontario. Selected papers written
by students in the program are reviewed by the Journal for possible publication.
I would like to thank the following people for their criticism and assistance in the
preparation of this paper. Ron Lebi, Andrew Ranachan, Shelley Gavigan and Jim
Hathaway.
1. Old Age Security Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. 0-8, Blind Persons' Rights Act, R.S.O.
1980, c. 44, Disabled Persons' Allowance Act, R.S.O. 1960 c. 107, Unemploy-
ment Insurance Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. U-i.
Ia. Canada Assistance Plan, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-1. For a general review of the his-
tory of social assistance in Canada, see National Council on Welfare, Welfare
in Canada: The Tangled Safety Net (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services,
1987) at 1.
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for whatever reason, are unable to support themselves. These at-
titudes find expression in the current welfare system in a variety of
forms including exhaustive sets of rules designed to separate out
'deserving' from 'non-deserving' persons and extensive monitoring
to help catch welfare 'cheats'."2
The same point is made more strongly by Leon Muszynski:
"Welfare is the historical descendent of public charity. It is con-
sidered shameful to be on welfare. The system is explicitly or im-
plicitly designed and administered to reinforce the idea that to be a
welfare recipient is an inferior class of citizen. There is an explicit
purpose in this which is rooted in the origins of public assistance:
to assure that welfare will be sufficiently unattractive as to make it
more desirable to work than to be dependent on the state."3
Others have argued that welfare has developed from a charity to a
right, and should be seen as an essential component of a liberal state.
According to Ian Johnstone:
"Welfare entitlements are conceived as rights, not favours-a fulfil-
ment of the ideal that each person [is] entitled to his/her due as
citizen and individual deserving of dignity. In liberal egalitarian
theory, welfare is among those rights that are essential to the enjoy-
ment of all other rights.., the ideal of universal welfare rights and
a relatively equal distribution of wealth is, to a significant extent, a
precondition for equalizing participatory opportunities, which in
turn is a prerequisite of collective self-government."4
Indeed, the Canada Assistance Plan, which transfers federal money to
the provinces to pay for welfare, provides that social assistance is a
2. Supra, note la at 10.
3. L. Muszynski, "Work and Welfare: A Guide to Income Security Reform in
Canada" (Draft paper prepared for the National Council on Welfare, 1988) at
41.
4. I. Johnstone, "Section 7 of the Charter and Constitutionally Protected Welfare"
(1988) 46 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. I at 9.
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right if a recipient is in need,5 a view endorsed by the Toronto Star:.
"The very concept of welfare is as a universal right for those who
demonstrably are in need. At the core of the social contract which
binds this nation together is the agreement that those in economic
trouble have an unquestioned claim on a share of the bounty that
is Canada's heritage. It is need-not an arbitrarily defined con-
tribution-that is that basis for welfare and this is how it should
stay.
'" 6
The concept of a right to welfare is, however, increasingly being chal-
lenged. Many argue that instead of a right, welfare must be part of a
reciprocal obligation in which recipients are required to enter into a
work or training programme. If a person refuses, thereby not living up
to her/his obligation, the State ought not to be under any obligation to
continue benefits. A leading exponent of this view, Professor Lawrence
Mead of New York University, defended this conception of welfare in
this way:
"Compared to politicians, the public is humanitarian but not per-
missive. It doesn't want simply to give things to people. It wants to
give things to them but also to uphold social standards. This is why
workfare is potentially attractive, because it speaks to both sides of
the public mind. It helps people but at the same time requires that
they function in ways other people expect."7
This public attitude is arguably at the root of efforts to incorporate
work requirements in welfare legislation:
5. A person in need is defined as "a person who, by reasons of loss of the prin-
cipal family provider, illness, disability, age or other cause of any kind accept-
able to the provincial authority, is found to be unable (on the basis of a test
established by the provincial authority that takes into account the person's
budgetary requirements and the income and resources available to him to meet
such requirements) to provide adequately for himself or for himself and his de-
pendents." Canada Assistance Plan, supr, note Ia, s. 5.1.
The Report of the Social Assistance Review Committee: Transitions also accepted
that "all members of the community have a presumptive right to social assis-
tance based on need", infra, note 11 at 11.
6. "Work and Welfare" The Toronto Star (23 October 1982) B2 Editorial.
7. L. Mead in Workfare versus Welfare, Subcommittee on Trade, Productivity and
Economic Growth of the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United
States, 97th Congress, 2nd Session, April 23, 1986 (Washington: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1986) at 38 [hereinafter Trade]. Mead is author of Beyond
Entitlement: The Social Obligation of Citizenship (New York: Free Press, 1981).
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"The supply of public assistance by governments is in part depend-
ent upon taxpayers' perceptions of the neediness of those receiving
benefits. The willingness of the poor to work for benefits seems, for
most people, to be a convincing demonstration of need... Work re-
quirements make welfare more equitable. It has been an abiding
principle of welfare reform efforts that those who work should be
better off financially than those who do not."8
This general attitude was confirmed by a recent Gallup Poll which
found that 84 percent of Canadians believe that welfare recipients
should be made to work as a condition of welfare.9 The motivation to
change our concept of welfare has been influenced by a number of
factors.
First, the number of persons on welfare has increased dramatically
since the inception of social assistance, thereby drastically increasing
the costs of these programs. For example, in 1951-2, the Federal
Government paid $83,204,000 to the provinces under Federal Provin-
cial Cost-Share Programs. By 1981-2, this had increased to
$2,205,805,000.10 In Ontario, between 1969 and 1987, the number of
persons on social assistance increased by about 175 percent1, There
are currently 281,074 persons receiving social assistance in Ontario.
12
In 1988, more than $2 billion will be spent in Ontario by the federal,
provincial and municipal governments on social assistance.13 In On-
tario, the provincial portion of social assistance costs increased be-
tween 1980-1 and 1986-7 from $777 Million to $1.73 billion.
14
Second, many of the people now on welfare are seen as employable or
potentially employable. The Report estimates that one in six single per-
sons on welfare is employable.15 It is also estimated that since 1969 the
8. M. Wiseman, "Workfare and Welfare Policies" (1986) 9:3 Focus 1. Focus is the
publication of the Fraser Institute in British Columbia.
9. "Polls say most Canadians believe welfare recipients should be made to work"
The Toronto Star (1 December 1988) A3.
10. Statistics Canada, Social Allowance and Services: Social Security National
Programs, Voluma 6 (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services, 1982) at 10.
11. Ontario, Report of the Social Assistance Review Committee: Transitions (Toronto:
Queen's Printer, 1988) (Chair George Thomson) [hereinafter the Report].
12. Ibid. at 31.
13. Ibid. at 1.
14. Ibid. at 79.
15. Ibid. at 30.
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number of employable recipients has increased by 400 percent. This
category accounts for 70 percent of the increase in General Welfare
Assistance 16 cases since 1981.17
A similar concern was raised in the Federal Nielson Task Force Review
on the Canada Assistance Plan. It estimated that in 1979 'employables'
represented 12 percent of Canada Assistance Plan expenditures, and
this figure rose to 50 percent by 1986. Thus, in the view of some, "costs
attributable to employables may soon become intolerable if historical
rates of increase in these costs continue."
18
Because there is no clear definition of the term "employable", some of
this increase may be explained by different usages of the same term.
19
Furthermore, "structural unemployment, and increased competition
for scarce jobs ... effectively render marginally employable individuals
unemployable for all intents and purposes".20
Others have argued that the problem is not a welfare problem but
rather a problem endemic to the labour market:
16. This category does not include recipients of Family Benefits.
17. Report, supra, note I1 at 35.
18. M. Hegan, "Work Instead of Welfare" (1987) 10:1 Perception 8 at 11.
19. For example, as women have moved into the workforce, proponents of chang-
ing eligibility guidelines have recently argued that women on welfare can also
move into the workforce and should no longer be viewed differently than un-
employed men. Does this mean that more women on welfare will now be
viewed as "employable" due to the changing role of some women in the
workforce?
See R. Carleson & K. Hopkins, "Whose Responsibility is Social Responsibility?
The Reagan Rationale" (1981) 39 Public Welfare 8 at 10:
"In our society the freedom to conceive or bear children should carry
with it a responsibility to provide support. Today, more than half of all
mothers with children are working to support themselves and their
children or to contribute to their family income. A mother has as great
an obligation to support her children as a father."
Mr. Carleson and Mr. Hopkins were senior policy advisors to former President
Reagan.
For a discussion of the contradiction in seeing women as equally employable
while maintaining gender inequality both in the workforce and in the welfare
structure, see Sylvia Law, "Women, Work, Welfare and the Preservation of the
Patriarchy" (1983) 131 U. Penns. LR. 1249.
20. Canadian Union of Public Employees, Brief to the Ontario Social Assistance
Review Committee (1987) at 10 [unpublished].
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"Income security protects groups deemed to be at risk in the
market, the elderly, the sick, the disabled and those who can't find
work. But it also to a varying extent removes the immediate com-
pulsion to work or starve. It is after all the explicit intention of
major social programs like welfare and unemployment insurance to
allow certain groups to opt out of employment either permanantly
or temporarily because work is unavailable or inappropriate. The
issue according to some is that income security has protected
people too much and the problem now has become one of too
many work disincentives in the face of available jobs... [but] (t)he
issue of work disincentives is to a large extent a subjective and
political issue. It boils down to the extent to which we as a society
are willing to use the income security system to influence the
quality and rewards offered by employment... (as) the problem of
work disincentives is really a problem of the relative decline in the
rewards offered by the labour market rather than the inherent at-
tractiveness of welfare per se."21
Third, welfare is seen as an affront to the work ethic.22 Since work is
integral to our economy and culture, it is argued that those on welfare
are not participating in the values that make us a nation. In introduc-
ing workfare in Saskatchewan, Minister of Social Services Grant
Schmidt argued this point:
"Show me any law in Canada, either moral or legal that says you
should be able to live in this country and refuse to work, ever. And,
if a few, a small minority, have no interest in working, I have no
qualms about cutting them off welfare."2
In response to factors such as these, Ontario's former Minister of
Community and Social Services, John Sweeney, established the Social
Assistance Review Committee (hereinafter the Committee) in 1986 to
review social assistance in Ontario. Mr. Sweeney defined the need for
a review of welfare legislation in this way:
21. Muszynski, supra, note 3 at 3 and 45.
22. Former United States President Nixon stated that "continued dependence on
welfare induces a spiritual and moral disintegration fundamentally destructive
to the national fiber" New York Times (29 December 1971). However, others
have argued that work in the context of welfare is what is antithetical to our
work ethic. See R. Polangin, "Conscripted Labor Workfare and the Poor"
(1982) 16 Clearinghouse Review 542 at 544: "Requiring the poor to perform
public labor contradicts our traditional views of work, and merely affords
society an opportunity to extract retribution from the disadvantaged."
23. T.W. Elliot, "Workfare Bonanza" (1988) 17:7 Briarpatch 14 at 15.
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"Those [social assistance] statutes were designed for a different
age-a time of much lower unemployment and a time when most
women stayed home, the great majority of families had two parents,
and fathers were typically the sole wage earners in the family. For
many, that is not the reality of life in Ontario in 1986. As a result, I
am convinced our system of social assistance needs a thorough
overhaul. One of the main purposes of the review I am announcing
today will be to examine the overall direction of social assistance in
Ontario."24
In its review of Ontario's welfare system, the Committee made recom-
mendations designed to improve the welfare system for recipients and
to encourage the establishment of programmes to get people off wel-
fare. It also explicitly adopted the view that welfare is part of a mutual
obligation:
"We have also accepted the proposition that society operates by
way of mutual responsibilities and shared obligations between the
state and the citizenry. The state has certain responsibilities for its
citizens, and all citizens have certain responsibilities for one
another, which are fulfilled through the state. In our view the state
has a responsibility to ensure that realistic and meaningful oppor-
tunities are made available to recipients of assistance to help them
increase their capacity for self-reliance and reduce their depend-
ence upon assistance. If the state fulfils its responsibility, it is
legitimate and reasonable to insist that some recipients also have
responsibilities that they must fulfil."25
Some of the Report's recommendations reflect the change in attitude
toward welfare as a component of a mutual relationship between state
and individual, specifically its recommendations with respect to job
training and working for welfare, that is, workfare. These recommen-
dations suggest that a condition of receiving social assistance ought to
be a recipient's willingness to enter into a job training program or "op-
portunity planning", but that work for welfare be explicitly prohibited.
Specifically, recommendation 79 requires that "recipients other than
those who are disabled, sole-support parents, elderly, or temporarily
unemployable should be required to participate in opportunity plan-
ning as a condition of receiving full social assistance benefits".2 6
Refusal to participate in a job training program would result in a
24. Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Debates at 2161 (7 July 1986).
25. Report, supra, note II at 230.
26. Report, supra. note 11 at 235.
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decrease in benefits. 27 Recommendation IIl provides that "the re-
quirement to 'work for welfare' should be prohibited".
28
For persons other than members of an exempted group recognized in
Recommendation 79, a recipient would be required to report to an
"opportunity planner" within two months of beginning to receive
benefits. Failure to enter into an available program could result in the
reduction of benefits. The Committee has proposed that the "oppor-
tunity planner" not have the role of deciding if benefits should be
reduced as the kind of assistance provided by such planning can be
more "successful and effective if delivered by persons whose ability to
influence behaviour is not the result of their power to affect entitle-
ment to financial assistance."29
The Minister has indicated to a number of groups which have con-
sulted with him about the Committee that he "likes" opportunity plan-
ning. He also indicated that many of the other recommendations are
being studied. However, Mr. Nixon, Ontario's Treasurer, has also indi-
cated that the next budget is to be "lean and mean" and, therefore,
27. Report, supra note II at 235, Recommendation 80.
28. Ibid. at 311.
29. Ibid. at 211-212, Recommendation 73.
Mr. Sweeney, in meeting with a member of the Social Planning Council sug-
gested that the "separate role" model used for Vocational Rehabilitation in the
Workers' Compensation context be adopted. It is ironic that he suggests adopt-
ing this model as it has been criticized for its failure to separate the rehabilita-
tion function from the compensation function. See The Report of the Ontario
Task Force on the Vocational Rehabilitation Services of the Workers' Compen-
sation Board, An Inijury to One is An Injury to All (Ontario, 1987) at 61-61:
"Rehabiliation must be separated from compensation in the minds of
the injured workers, the counsellors, the employers, and the organiza-
tions and individuals from whom services are purchased... the struc-
ture of WCB must be changed to separate the functions of claims and
rehabiliation and rehabilitation must be made a full partner in the
process."
This recommendation was also reflected in the submission of Sean O'Flynn,
Secretary Treasurer of the Ontario Federation of Labour to this Task Force:
"Rehabilitation deserves the trust and faith of the injured worker, and
this cannot be fostered in an atmosphere of threats and intimidation.
We believe that the rehabilitation services of the board should be
separated entirely from claims adjudication and become the second
fundamental cornerstone of the system", ibid. at 199.
(1989) 5 Journal of Law and Social Policy
while he likes the Report overall, he will probably only be able to im-
plement the recommendations that have minimal cost implications.30
While few would challenge the need to develop training programs, 31 it
will be argued in this paper that the recommendation to make such
programs mandatory is not only unnecessary, but is potentially puni-
tive. While the Committee viewed mandatory work for welfare as com-
pletely unacceptable, it accepted the assumption that without a
mandatory training program condition, people would not "maximize
their opportunities".32 It thereby implicitly accepted the questionably
accurate notion that people indeed have opportunities (for employ-
ment) to maximize. It will also be argued that it is unlikely that these
two options, that is, training for work versus work itself, will be kept
completely separate. As a practical reality, many training programs re-
30. These general remarks were made to members of the Social Planning Council
in a meeting they had with Mr. Sweeney the Fall of 1988. A number of repre-
sentatives of groups that met in a recent meeting sponsored by the NDP
Caucus also indicated that they had been told the same thing in meetings or
communications with Mr. Sweeney and Mr. Nixon. Based on these general
reactions by the Ministries, there is a strong feeling amongst those involved
with the Report that some form of "opportunity planning" will be implemented.
Other participants at this meeting have heard that job descriptions are being
formulated for "Opportunity Planning Developers" and people are already
vying for these jobs.
Since the writing of this paper, a response to the Report was announced on
May 18, 1989. Mr. Sweeney indicated that $415 million would be spent on
reforming the social assistance system. In part of the announcement, the Min-
istry recognized that there are barriers to employment for social assistance
recipients and made a commitment of S54 million to expand employment and
training programs. In addition, $8 million was designated for literacy training.
While the announcement says that this initiative is in keeping with the prin-
ciples of the Report and "opportunity planning", it is unclear if the Ministry in-
tends to make this program mandatory.
31. Indeed this was the recommendation of many groups to the Social Assistance
Review Committee, including Parkdale Community Legal Services, the Social
Planning Council, the New Democratic Party, and the United Steelworkers of
America. It was also recommended in a number of the Reports background
papers, including: Burt Perrin Associates, "A Review of Training and Educa-
tional Programs for Social Assistance Recipients Entering the Labour Force"
(March 1987) and M. Hess, "Education and Skill Requirements for Future
Employment" (April 1987). [Background Paper for the Social Assistance
Review Committee, in Report of the Social Assistance Review Committee: Transi-
tions (Appendix G) supra, note 11.]
32. Report, supra, note 11 at 230.
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quire placement in a worksite.33 Furthermore, many jobs can be seen
as training for another job. This is not wrong per se but is problematic
if one thinks of training and working as two distinguishable categories.
This paper will look at the Social Assistance Review Committee's
recommendations 7934 and 11135 in the light of workfare in the United
States and Canada, job training in Canada and the current availability
of jobs in Canada.
WORKFARE IN THE UNITED STATES
The concept of workfare was not born during the recent period of U.S.
neo-conservatism. In 1625, the Chief Minister of France, Cardinal
Richelieu, called for the "creation of institutions in all cities in our
realm where able-bodied poor could be employed in public works".36
And the English Poor Laws questioned whether "it [was] possible to
assist the poor without, by that very act, giving people incentives for
behaviour that perpetuates poverty and dependency?" 37
In the late 1960s, the United States started its program of Work Incen-
tives (WIN). While the program varied in each state, recipients were
required to register for work and if offered a job under the program,
they were obliged to accept it or forfeit benefits. The program was al-
ways poorly funded; as a result, few jobs were offered, and few
recipients were adversely affected by the program. WIN programs have
continued, although the actual form has changed over the years and
varies by state.
If the purpose of the program was to get recipients off Aid for
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and into meaningful jobs,
33. In fact this has been suggested by some trade unionists, see United Steelworkers
of America, Submission to the Social Assistance Review Committee (1987) at 88 [un-
published]:
"Training by itself is not enough. It is becoming increasingly clear that
training by itself is not effective and that it must be accompanied by
concrete work experience. The Steelworkers would fully support an in-
itiative (for job placements)."
34. Report, supra, note 11.
35. bid
36. L. Goodwin, "Can Workfare Work?" (1981) 39 Public Welfare 19.
37. J. Gueron, Reforming Welfare with Work (New York: Ford Foundation, 1987) at 3.
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the program was a failure. In 1972, only 15 percent of WIN par-
ticipants were able to retain jobs more than 3 months after completing
the program.38 In 1973, less than half of WIN participants had a job
for greater than 3 months.39 In terms of rate of pay, the program was
even less successful for women than for men. In 1973, the average
hourly rate of pay for men placed under the WIN program was $2.58
per hour; for women it was $1.87. 40 Furthermore, WIN, like the
programs which followed under Presidents Carter and Reagan, was
implemented for recipients of AFDC.41 As most AFDC recipients are
women, one would have expected that the vast majority of persons in-
these programs would be women.42 However, Congress allowed that
priority be given to unemployed men receiving AFDC on the theory
that men were superior wage workers and women were needed to stay
home with their children.
43
President Carter introduced a program called the Comprehensive
Employment and Training Act (CETA) which guaranteed full time
public service employment, at a cost of $15 billion per year.44 The pro-
gram was ended by President Reagan who introduced the "Com-
munity Work Experience Program" (CWEp) as part of the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA). The program was not mandatory
federally, but the legislation allowed States to introduce a mandatory
requirement. Jobs were created that were usually part-time and tem-
porary. Ironically, the same legislation eliminated what many see as a
positive inducement to get people off welfare: the guideline that
recipients can keep some of their earnings from outside employment.
The OBRA reduced the amount of money one could earn while on
AFDC, and stiuplated that after four months of employment one
could no longer receive AFDC.45
38. M. Rein, Dilemmas of Welfare Policy: Why Work Strategies Haven't Worked (New
York. Praeger Publishing, 1982) at 72
39. Ibid. at 79.
40. Ibid. at 81.
41. A. Coudroglou, Women, Work and the Struggle for Self.Sufficiency (Washington;
University Press of America, 1982) at 1.
42. Polangin, supra, note 22 at 545.
43. Law, supra, note 19 at 1288.
44. Gueron, supra, note 37 at 10.
45. P. Sorenson, "Women, Work and Welfare" (1986) 20 Clearinghouse Review
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Most states required recipients to fulfil specific job-search activities
and an unpaid work experience. The cost of the program varied from
$165 per recipient in Arkansas to $1050 in Maryland.46 States were
able to maintain low cost programs if their major component was a
job search requirement. Those states which did have a work require-
ment usually provided entry level jobs which lasted a maximum of 13
weeks. California's program, Greater Avenues for Independent
(GAIN), specifically allocated $434 million for child care, paid
recipients on average what Californians receive, and prohibited the
displacement of union jobs.47 While numerous studies have shown
that recipients thought the work requirement was fair, it might not
have been viewed as positively had the requirement to work been
longer than 13 weeks.48 While success is difficult and controversial to
measure, recipients who participated in the program were 3 to 9 per-
cent more likely to have a job than those who did not, and they en-
joyed an 8 percent to 37 percent increase in income.
49
Perspectives on the success of the program vary greatly depending on
the nature of the program implemented by the various states. For ex-
ample, both Pennsylvania and Massachusetts set up very contrasting
workfare programs. The program in Massachusetts was completely
voluntary and provided job training, education, placement in wage
paying jobs, day care and transitional medical services.50 The average
cost of job placement was $3,000, most of which was used for
childcare.51 One year later, 86 percent of those who had been placed
into jobs were still employed.52 The average starting salary was $12,000
46. Gueron, supra, note 37 at 19.
47. The Sacramento Bee, October 13, 1985.
48. Gueron, supra, note 37 at 20.
49. Ibid. at 22. Variations depend upon which particular state program is assessed.
50. What is success? Is a program successful when it has overall cost the govern-
ment less to place people in jobs than maintain them on welfare? Is a program
successful when few recipients were actually able to move into jobs but those
that did had not previously worked for a number of years? Is it a success to
move people into jobs that pay less than average wages for a particular in-
dustry but this pay is greater than what they would have received on social as-
sistance? Is a program a success if fewer people are now receiving social
assistance but the lines at a soup kitchen are longer? T. Rofuth, "Moving
Clients into Jobs" (1987) 45 Public Welfare 10.
51. Ibid. at 13.
52. Ibid.
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per year, compared to $8,000 that a person could receive on AFDC.
Eight-two percent of the persons placed in jobs were women. The
main criticism of the program was that it enroled only 24,000 persons,
and that, because it was voluntary, it helped those who had the fewest
problems in terms of skills, education and motivation.
By contrast, in Pennsylvania, a compulsory program was established
which placed 180,000 persons in jobs, saving the state $380 million.
5 3
No money was provided for childcare, and job training was minimal.
Only 24 percent of the placements were women.54 As a result, the pro-
gram was not successful from the perspective of helping women enter
the workforce or persons who needed skill development before they
could enter the workforce. The programs have recently been evaluated
by two U.S. Senate Committees.55 The success of the program seems to
vary depending now only on which program is being considered, but
also, and more significantly, on what one sees as the purpose and
result of thse programs.
Judith Gueron, of Manpower Demonstration Research Group, showed
that employment opportunities and earning levels had increased for
those who participated in CWEP, but noted that "it is important that
the expectation about what a program can achieve be consistent with
the level of funding it receives". 56 At the Federal level, the WIN
programme was funded at $365 million in 1980, but to $220 million in
1981, and further reduced to $110 million in 198257 thereby making it
impossible to improve or maintain any type of program. Ms. Gueron's
analysis has been echoed by Morton Sklar, former director of Jobs
Watch:
"rhe key point in discussing and evaluating the situation of
workfare that needs to be made, and it is true about job training in
general, is that you get out what you put in. Workfare and other
53. Supra, note 50 at 13.
54. Ibid. at 20.
55. These are the Social Security and Family Policy Committee on Finance, infra,
note 56, and the Subcommittee on Trade, Productivity and Economic Growth
of the Joint Economic Committee, supra, note 7.
56. Welfare: Reform or Replacement. Subcommittee on Social Security and Family
Policy of the Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate, February 23, 1987, U.S.
Government Printing House, Washington at 165.
57. Ibid. at 169.
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very low cost interventions that are aimed primarily at discouraging
people from continuing to participate really do nothing to change
the circumstances of the recipients that lead them to a situation
where they had to be participating in welfare in the first place:"
58
The cost of workfare in relation to regular AFDC benefits varied from
2:1 (Florida) to 5:1 (Georgia).5 9 In a report of the U.S. General Ac-
counting Office, workfare was found to cost $360,00 while saving only
$115,000 in benefit payments.6° Therefore, for those who saw workfare
as a cost saving measure, the program was a failure (at least in the
short term) nor was much success achieved in terms of skill develop-
ment. According to Mead, "the work positions have not provided
much in the way of skills development, largely because most par-
ticipants had the required skill level for the assignment when they
started."6 1 It was felt that:
"Work requirements for AFDC recipients seem to reflect changes in
public attitudes about welfare and the appropriate role of women,
and apparently are not based on evidence of the effectiveness of
work pr ms in helping women become economically inde-
pendent 'Wa
In addition, guarantees that public sector employees would not be dis-
placed were not met.63 In New York, for example, a group of sanita-
tion workers was laid off, became eligible for welfare, and within two
months was performing the same tasks as when they were working, ex-
cept that they were now on workfare.64 Although litigated in various
58. Trade, supra, note 7 at 3.
59. Ibid. at 5.
60. Polangin, supra, note 22 at 545 quoting U.S. General Accounting, "Insights
Gained in Workfare".
61. Trade, supra. note 7 at 79.
62. Sorenson, supra, note 45 at 119.
63. Trade, supra; note 7 at 5.
A similar concern was raised by Leo Gerard, of the United Steelworkers of
America, in their brief, supra, note 33 at 8, to the Social Assistance Review
Committee:
"Specifically, we want to ensure that the job placement strategy does
not undermine the job security of existing employees, and that it does
not depress wages paid to existing employees."
64. Trade, supra. note 7 at 6.
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states, the government was often able to show that the public sector
layoffs happened as a result of budget cuts, not because of workfare.65
Other critics pointed out that since AFDC recipients were mainly
single mothers, it would make more sense to enforce support payments
against fathers rather than to view the problem as being created by
women on welfare who weren't working. For others, though, workfare
was an essential way to remove recipients from welfare by making
work more attractive than welfare. According to workfare proponent,
Lowell Gallaway, "How are these individuals to acquire the work ex-
perience that would offer than the possiblity of upward mobility in our
society if we make life on welfare more attractive than life in an entry
level job in the labor market?" 66
According to Professor Mead, the mandatory nature of the programs
has been seen as essential to their success:
"My interpretation is that obligation is what makes the programs
tick. It is essential that some activity be required of recipients. It is
much less critical what that activity is. Job search, training and
education as well as immediate work in govemment can promote
employment-provided they are mandatory.,67
Professor Mead goes so far as to claim that people on welfare are a
fundamentally different type of people and need the authority of wel-
fare administrators. He states that:
"The basic fact about these people is that they live under authority;
they live under the authority of the welfare department, and they
need to take direction from that authority because they themselves
don't have it as clearly in mind as many other people as to what
they are supposed to do ... But the recipients are different enough
from the rest so that they in fact accept it (work requirement) and it
fills a need they have."6
Mead feels that one need not be concerned about the certain social
conditions such as racism and sexism which might create people's de-
pendence on welfare:
65. Trade, supra. note 7 at 6.
66. Ibi. at 51.
67. Subcommittee on Social Security and Family Policy, supra, note 56 at 219.
68. Trade. supra, note 7 at 99.
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"The traditional explanations for non-work and welfare are no
longer persuasive... One of them is that racial discrimination
keeps many of the poor out of the job market Some claim that
there is not enough employment or that daycare is a problem or
that training is necessary or that there are disincentives to working
in welfare itself. The research doesn't support any of these theories.
.. My own view is that a better explanation is simply that the wel-
fare poor have simply not been expected to work... The main
reason the long-term poor (women, Blacks, teenagers) do not work
steadily is problems of work discipline peculiar to them, not the
limitations of the labor market."69
Or that people are not seeking jobs because of poor work conditions:
"A fear that available jobs will be inhumane is unreasonable as
long as they meet federal standards for pay and conditions. Per-
haps these standards must be raised before, politically, we can
mandate such jobs, for instance through raising the minimum wage
or requiring health coverage. But this is an issue separate from wel-
fare reform."
70
While Professor Mead supports the mandatory nature of the programs
as essential for welfare recipients and desired by them, others saw that
"the principal effect of the mandatory work registration requirement is
to suggest to employable persons that they need not aply for AFDC to
begin with, unless the need is urgent".
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The special priority given to unemployed men, and the fact that a
women whose spouse worked was exempted from workfare even if she
had no children meant that this AFDC program structurally dis-
criminated against women. Thus:
"Despite substantial formal support for the legal ideal that women
be offered equal access to traditionally male occupations, the wel-
fare system discriminates against poor women in allocating jobs.
Such discrimination is seen as justified by the need to preserve the
stability of the traditional family. Thus, the welfare system operates
to preserve and reinforce patriarchy by assuming that women
should be dependent on men: when and only when, male economic
support is withdrawn will the state provide aid. Yet, at the same
69. Trade, supra, note 7 at 36-41.
70. Subcommittee on Social Policy and Family Policy, supra. note 56 at 221.
71. Law, supra. note 19 at 1337 quoting Robert Anderson, Administrator of Com-
prehensive Employment Development of the Department of Labour, author of
the 9th Work Incentives (WIN) report.
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time that the welfare system favours men in the allocation of scarce
jobs, by placing a formal requirement on poor women the system
declares that childwork is not legitimate work."72
With respect to women recipients, other authors also criticized the mo-
tives of the workfare program. According to Mr. Sorenson:
"Work requirements for AFDC recipients seem to reflect changes in
public attitudes about welfare and the appropriate role of women,
and apparently are not based on evidence of the effectiveness of
work programmes in helping women become economically inde-pendent.731
An outline of the different programs illustrates how job searching,
placement and training have been used as part of welfare requirement
programs. The success of these programs varied both by state and by
what one sees as the goal of these programs. Cutting the amount of
money spent on welfare was not synonymous with successfully placing
people into jobs. For example, in contrasting the programs in Pennsyl-
vania and Massachusetts, if the goal is to take people off welfare, the
Pennsylvania program was a success. However, if the goal is to get
those who most depend on AFDC, that is, women, off welfare, it was a
failure.
The programs also did not place all recipients equally. Women were
less likely to be placed in jobs and little attention was given to provid-
ing childcare except in California and Massachusetts. Again those
most dependent on AFDC did not benefit. These programs were also
less 'successful', as relatively fewer recipients were placed, and they
were also relatively more expensive to implement.
WORKFARE IN CANADA
The most recent example of workfare in Canada has been in Sas-
katchewan. In 1984, the provincial government introduced a program
whereby employable recipients without children had to accept job
training or placement. The onus was on the recipients to show that
they were not employable.74 Benefits were cut from $581 to $384 a
72. Law, supra, note 19 at 1281.
73. Sorenson, supra, note 45 at 119.
74. G. Riches, "Workfare" (1984) 13:3 Briarpatch 14 at 15.
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month if recipients did not accept a job offered through workfare.75 In
most cases, the jobs lasted about 20 weeks. Although the Canada Assis-
tance Plan specifically states that "no person shall be denied assistance
because he refused or has refused to take part in a work activity
project", 76 the Saskatchewan government has maintained that its
workfare program is about employable opportunities and is not a
mandatory work requirement. Grant Schmidt, then Minister of Social
Services, justified the program in this way:
"Maybe there's something wrong with the way I was raised, maybe
there's something wrong with the way my church taught me...
There must be something wrong with the system because they made
me into a person who believes there is nothing illegal about
work"
77
While few permanent jobs have been created in Saskatchewan,
recipients forced to take advantage of "employment opportunities"
have built a golf course, cleared ditches and built a private health spa.
The Saskatchewan Government Employees Union has also found that
since 1984 over 50 percent of park maintenance workers have been
laid off because of lack of work.
In Manitoba a limited workfare program was established in 1982 in
Portage la Prairie. Welfare recipients were forced to clear brush at
$4.00 per hour.78 The program was stopped a few months later as the
government felt it had spent enough on brush cutting.
In Alberta, a program was to be started in 1982 requiring welfare
recipients to work up to 40 hours per week in the home of a disabled
elderly person. However, the program never got underway because
people were reluctant to hire the recipients.
79
To date, then, there has been little experience with workfare in
Canada except in Saskatchewan. While it prima facie seems to be con-
trary to the Canada Assistance Plan, the program has so far survived in
75. Elliot, supra, note 23 at 16.
76. Supra, note 5, s. 15(3).
77. Elliot, supra, note 23 at 15.
78. M. Hess, "Traditional Workfare: Pros and Cons" (April 1987) at 3. IBack-
ground paper for the Social Assistance Review Committee in Report of the So-
cial Assistance Review Committee: Transitions (Appendix G), supra, note 11.1
79. Ibid. at 4.
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that Province despite a Court challenge by the Saskatchewan Union of
Unemployed Workers.
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JOB TRAINING IN CANADA
Few would argue that it is wrong for the government or industry to
provide training programs for workers or for those who want to enter
the workforce.81 It is a rather basic notion that most jobs require some
skills and people must, therefore, be assisted to learn the required
skills.
The most basic skill needed in our information-based economy is
literacy. Yet 18 percent of the general population is functionally il-
literate, including more than 50 percent of social assistance
recipients. 82 The Forget Commission recognized this as a great barrier
to employment:
"From the perspective of the labour market, the lack of language
and numeracy skills is a significant problem. Jobs for those who
lack basic skills are rare; consequently they remain unemployed or
limited to employment in unstable, low-paid jobs... For those
seeking to increase the nation's productivity and competitiveness,
the existence of an undereducated segment of the adult labour force
constitutes a serious barrier."83
A review of General Welfare caseloads has shown that 64 percent of
recipients have less than a secondary school education8 4 The Ministry
of Community and Social Services has estimated that at least 120,000
social assistance recipients need some form of job training,8 5 a fact
reflected in a number of briefs to the Social Assistance Review Com-
80. "Welfare Cuts Challenged" (1985) 14:4 Briarpatch I1.
81. Training programs may include any skills from literacy training to English as
a Second Language to a post-secondary degree. They may be relatively short in
duration, a few days, to a few years, although one year is the most typical max-
imum. Programs may involve only the actual training or may include support
services such as money for child-care, transportation, and health benefits.
Therefore, disagreements over training programs centre more on what training
programs needs to include rather than the actual training, per se.
82. Burt Perrin Associates, supra, note 31.
83. Commission of Inquiry on Unemployment Insurance, (Ottawa: Canadian Govern-
ment Publishing, November 1986) (Chair: C.E. Forget) at 138-9.
84. Ontario Federation of Labour, Submission to the Social Assistance Review Com-
mittee (1987) at 31 [unpublished].
85. Burt Perrin Associates, supra, note 31 at 46.
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mittee. The Social Planning Council of Metropolitan Toronto, for ex-
ample, stated that:
"In order to provide alternatives to welfare dependency, Ontario's
social assistance program must have in place a full array of
employment support services. The SPC recommends substantially
increasing funding for support services including life-skills, voca-
tional assessment, job search and placement assistance, oppor-
tunities for training and education upgrading, as well as subsidies
for child care, transportation and other employment related expen-
ses. Such services must be flexible and capable of being adopted to
meet the particular needs of individual recipients."8
Leo Gerard, Director of the United Steelworkers of America, also sug-
gested that:
"If recipients are to overcome barriers to employment, training in
the broadest sense of the word is essential. A wide variety of train-
ing programs-everything from basic literacy, to life skills, to more
formal instruction-must become the central elements of the social
assistance program."8
The Ontario Federation of Labour called for "workplace centred
training" because:
'"There is no solution to the problem of low wages and mar-
ginalised labour which does not incorporate systematic, work-placetraining." 8
And, in the brief submitted by Parkdale Community Legal Services,
non-mandatory training programs were advocated:
86. Social Planning Council of Metropolitan Toronto Submission to the Social Assis-
tance Review Committee (1986) [unpublished].
87. United Steelworkers Submission, supra, note 33 at 7-8.
These concerns are also reflected by the Social Planning Council, Living on the
Margin (Toronto, 1986) at 106-107.
"In order to provide productive alternatives to welfare dependency,
Ontario's social assistance programs must have in place a full array of
employment support services including life skills, vocational assess-
ment, training and educational upgrading, job search and placement
assistance, as well as subsidies for child care, transportation and other
employment related expenses."
88. Ontario Federation of Labour Submission, supra. note 84 at 31-32.
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"It is certainly worthy of note that demand for these programs
(training and job placement) has far exceeded the supply of ser-
vices which would certainly lay to rest the notion that recipients do
not wish to be independent of the welfare system... Under nocir-
cumstances should receipt or levels of benefits be determined on
the basis of participation in these programs except where financial
benefit increases above adequate compensation for all basic
needs."89
While the need for training programs in general is not disputed, a
review of previous attempts at job training illustrates that it is not the
ultimate solution for social assistance recipients or anyone else for that
matter. Many studies have shown that there is a relatively poor match-
ing between training and job opportunities. In an overall evaluation of
Federal Job Training Programs, the Canadian Advisory Council on
the Status of Women found that 33 percent of trainees in 1975 were
being trained for jobs for which there was an excess of available
workers.90 A study of Ontario's Employment Support Initiatives pro-
gram found that of 4954 participants, only 10.4 percent found full-time
work and 8.8 percent found part-time work. This general lack of
matching of training to jobs was summed up by the Forget Commis-
sion:
"Employers and woekrs are cynical about the ability of programs to
train for occupations in which there are shortages. In 1983/84 al-
most 65% of trainees were registered in programs in areas of oc-
cupational surplus. It is not clear how much of the incorrect
matching of training to jobs is caused by incorrect forecasting and
how much by failing to follow forecasts. There is widespread con-
cern, however, that occupational forecasts currently produces are
not accurate and are perhaps inadequate to the task."' L
In addition to this general problem of matching trainees to jobs,
programs have remained underfunded and demand outstrips oppor-
tunities to enter training programs. For example, the provincial
Employment Strategies Initiative92 has a waiting list for each program
89. Parkdale Community Legal Services, Submission to the Social Assistance Review
Committee (1986) [unpublished].
90. P. Dale, Women and Jobs: The Impact of Federal Goveniment Employment
Strategies on Women (Ottawa: Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of
Women, 1980) at 49.
91. Forget Commission, supra, note 83 at 141.
92. This program offers employment counselling and is a referral service for
education programs.
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equal to about half the number of participants.93 The Federal Govern-
ment cut the budget of its job training program called Canadian Job
Strategies by 10 percent in 1986, and by a further 10 percent in 1987.
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In addition, every federal literacy program currently has a waiting
list.95
In addition to the general problem of matching trainees to programs,
certain classes have derived disproportionably few benefits from these
programs. While women tend to have a higher unemployment rate
than men, they are still grossly unrepresented in national and provin-
cial training programs.96 In 1983/84, women represented 30 percent of
full-time participants in skills training courses. 97 In 1975, women rep-
resented 3 percent of the participants in federal apprenticeship train-
ing programs.98 In 1983/84, women's representation in apprenticeship
training programs increased to 3.8 percent of the 56,519 participants.99
This program cost the federal government $200 million representing a
sizeable contribution of the federal government whose primary
beneficiary is overwhelmingly male.1 0 In provincial apprenticeship
programs, women made up 7 percent of the participants. 101 The
majority of these women were in hairdressing or cooking programs.
Persons with disabilities also experience an unemployment rate higher
than the general population. In a survey conducted by the Employ-
ment Equity Branch of Employment and Immigration Canada, dis-
93. Burt Perrin Associates, supra, note 31 at 23.
94. ibid. at 6.
95. ibid. at 71.
96. In Ontario, the unemployment rate for women is 16 percent higher than it is
for men. See New Democratic Caucus Toward a New Ontario: Redesigning
Ontario's Social Assistance Program (23 January 1987) at 22. Nationally, between
1971 and 1985, the unemployment rate of women has been 2 percent higher
than for men, except in 1982 when it was lower. See Canadian Advisory Coun-
cil on the Status of Women Integration and Participation (Ottawa, 1987) at 39.
97. D. Boothby, Women Re-Entering the Labour Force and Training Programs (Ot-
tawa: Economic Council of Canada, 1986) at 17.
98. Dale, supra, note 90 at 52.
99. Boothby, supra, note 97 at 17.
100. Ibid. at 47.
101. L.M. Calzavara, Barriers to Women's Employment Opportunities (City of Toronto,
1987) funpublished].
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abled persons were found to have an unemployment rate over 100 per-
cent higher than the national average. 102 General problems ex-
perienced by disabled persons in training programs include:
"Negative attitudes of able-bodied students and teachers; schools
not equipped with technical aids to assist in minimizing the dis-
ability; educational institutions refusing to accept into programs
those whom they feel will not be employed after completion of the
program; physical access to classrooms."103
Age also impacts on the likelihood of participating in a training pro-
gram. Persons over 40 are very unlikely to enter a training program 104
most likely because they feel they will be unable to learn a new and
marketable skill or lack the confidence to return to school.
People who are unemployed for a longer period of time are also less
likely to participate in training programs. Nearly 17 percent of persons
employed full-time took part in short-term government training
programs. However, only 11.3 percent of persons unemployed for less
than 6 months participated, and 9 percent of persons unemployed for
greater than 6 months enrolled in a training program. 105
Persons with less education were also less likely to participate. Persons
who had a post-secondary education were four times as likely to take
part in a training program than a person with an elementary educa-
tion 106 probably because they had the confidence in the skills they
had acquired through formal education. This self-selection only reen-
forces that those with skills will get training and those without don't
see formal training programs as part of their cultural norm. The fact
that some persons have less experience with education programs than
others may be a general deterrent to entering a training program. Ac-
cording to Picot:
"Those with below average education in their youth may be unlike-
ly to seek out training as adults. This may be related to their family
102. Calzavara, supra, note 101 at 73.
103. L. Halcomb, "Disabled Women: A New Issue" (1984) 50:1 Education Journal
of Rehabilitation at 18-22.
104. G. Picot, Unemployment and Training (Ottawa: Social and Economic Division,
Statistics Canada, 1987) at 14.
105. Ibid. at 9.
106. Ibid. at 14.
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background, the degree of difficulty they have in education or train-
ing programs, the norms of the social group in which they were
raised, their beliefs about benefits of education (or lack of), or
various other reasons. Furthermore, many of these people work in
occupations and industries where there is no history of training.
Thus, the habit of training does not develop among these workers
and industries... Older persons experiencing long-term unemploy-
ment are also unlikely to turn to training to assist their adjustment
process, because many have been away from such activities for
many years."
10 7
In order to encourage these persons to participate in training, it is
often suggested that support systems are essential. For example,
childcare has been seen as a necessary service to offer to involve more
women in training:
"Childcare is probably the single biggest barrier to the participation
of sole-support women in training programs."
08
"Lack of childcare facilities, little or no childcare allowance, the
burden of housework and other family responsibilities, all combine
to make educational training and upgrading either a burden or an
impossibility for most women."109
It has also been pointed out that the accessibility of public transporta-
tion and locations where training programs are offered must be im-
proved in order to make training a reality for disabled persons.
110
In order to be seen as a practical option by those on social assistance,
general support services are also needed. As noted by Burt Perrins:
"Severely employment disadvantaged people, which account for
many social assistance recipients, require a variety of supports to
enable them to participate and benefit from training. Many either
have never worked or have a history of failure in work, school, and
frequently other aspects of their lives. They require understanding
and assistance in developing self-confidence and overcoming very
practical barriers to training and employment."'' t
107. Picot, supra, note 104 at 5.
108. Burt Perrin Associates, supra, note 31 at 55.
109. Calzavara, supra. note 101 at 37.
110. Ibid. at 86.
111. Burt Perrin Associates, supra, note 31 at 11.
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Overall, therefore, it seems that when the range of auxiliary support
services is not offered and social assistance recipients are forced to
enter into "opportunity planning" programs, the programs have be-
come punitive. Without consideration of why some people are not par-
ticipating in training programs, the Social Assistance Review
Committee has proposed an unnecessary and potentially harsh condi-
tion on recipients. Given that numerous studies have shown that cur-
rent job training programs are already underfunded and cannot meet
current demand, why threaten recipients with reduction or loss of
benefits if they do not participate in training programs? Rather than
creating a bureaucracy to see if persons have fulfilled their obligations,
it may be more efficient to simply create accessible training programs
for persons to participate in.
JOB OPPORTUNITIES IN CANADA
While it is an accepted assumption that people need training to enter
most jobs, the question remains: What jobs?
In these post-recession years one is led to believe that there are
numerous jobs, if people would only take them. In November 1988,
Canada's unemployment rate was 7.8 percent.112 While this represents
over a million unemployed persons nationwide, this is often seen as a
figure representing near full-employment. When the figure is broken
down, the situation looks somewhat different. For example, the un-
employment rate for those between 15 and 24 was 12 percent.1 13 In
Ontario, the 1988 unemployment rate was lower at 5.0 percent.114
Regionally however, Sudbury had an unemploynment rate of 7.5 per-
cent, while Toronto's figure was 3.7 percent in the first quarter of
1989.115
One indicator of general job availability is the Help-Wanted Index,
which calculates the number of want ads in 18 newspapers in major
metropolitan areas. With 1981 as the base year (i.e. 100), the Help
Wanted Index in Ontario in 1962 was 26 and by 1987 was 162 com-
112. "The rising call for higher wages" The [Torontol Globe and Mail (17 December
1988) B-1.
113. Statistics Canada, Historical Labour Force Statistics (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply
and Services, 1989) at 201.
114. Ibid. at 226.
115. Statistics Canada, Estimates by Metropolitan Area: Table 14 (Microfiche #71-001).
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pared to a national figure of 120.116 It reached a record high in
November, 1988117 indicating that more employers were looking for
help (or at least advertising for help). However, of the jobs created in
1988, over one-third were part-time.118 This trend of creating part-time
jobs is not new. In 1983, 44 percent of the increase in the labour force
was due to the creation of part-time jobs.1 19 Since 1981, the proportion
of full-time jobs has decreased. 120 However, many of the over 1.5 mil-
lion workers in part-time jobs would have preferred full time employ-
ment. 121 In 1983, 24.5 percent of married women and 31.7 percent of
single women were working part-time because they could not find full-
time work This compares with 37.3 percent of married men and 28.2
percent of single men working part time and wanting full time
work. 122 Therefore, approximately one-third of part-time workers were
underemployed in terms of the number of hours they wanted to work
Lack of satisfaction is not surprising given that 78.8 percent of women
working part-time and 66.5 percent of men working part-time earned
less than $10,000 a year.123
In addition, legislation to ensure that workers receive a minimum
compensation for their work has not kept up with inflation. Since
1980, the increase in the minimum wage haa fallen well behind the in-
flation rate. In real dollars, the current minimum wage is 20 percent
lower than it was 8 years ago.124
Low rates of pay and the lack of full-time employment raise the ques-
tion of what would we be training workers to* do. These are in addition
116. Statistics Canada, Canadian Statistical Review (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and
Services, 1988), and Statistics Canada Help-Wanted Index (Ottawa: Ministry of
Supply and Services, 1988).
117. The /Toronto/ Globe and Mail, supra, note 112 at B-i.
118. Ibid. at B-4.
119. Statistics Canada, Women in Canada: A Statistical Report (Ottawa: Ministry of
Supply and Services, 1988) at 44.
120. Muszynski, supra, note 3 at 10.
121. Statistics Canada, The Labour Force (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services,
1984) at 63.
122. Ibid. at 57.
123. Statistics Canada, Women in the Labour Force (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and
Services, 1986-1987) at 35.
124. Social Planning Council, supra, note 87 at 2.
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to the structural impediments within the social assistance scheme
which discourage workers from taking part-time workI
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After reviewing both Federal and Provincial job training programs in
a background paper for the Social Assistance Review Committee, the
consulting firm, Burt Perrins Associates, concluded:
"There is a definite trend towards redistribution of existing jobs to
those which are lower paying, part-time or temporary in nature-
yet requiring at least a minimum of basic literacy skills. There is
also a suggestion that our economy requires a cadre of available
workers to fill such marginal jobs when they are needed: but when
these workers are not required, social assistance is needed to fill the
gap.
Given this picture, does it make any sense to provide training for
social assistance recipients?
The answer to this question is not clear: With a less than full
employment economy, there will always be some people who re-
quire social assistance. Training and education will help only so
much"
12 6
A number of submissions to the Committee showed that there was a
need to couple job training with job creatiori.
"What is needed above all else is a public and political commit-
ment to full employment. And by full employment we do not mean
"an acceptable level of employment"; or the economists "no ac-
celerating inflation rate of employment"; or the "normal" rate of
employment. What we mean is the right of every person to a well-
paid job."127
The need for a full-employment program was also shared by the So-
cial Planning Council.
125. These impediments are discussed in the Report, supra note 11. The main disin-
centive is that the amount of money which recipients can earn in wage paying
jobs is so low that recipients are discouraged from attempting to find work for
fear of loosing their benefits. A number of recommendations are made in this
Report to remove these barriers to employment
126. Burt Perrin Associates, supra, note 31 at 65.
127. United Steelworkers of America Submission to Social Assistance Review Com-
mittee, supra, note 33 at 9.
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"Any meaningful program to furnish welfare recipients with stable
jobs as an alternative to welfare will ultimately depend on the im-
plementation of policies designed to reduce unemployment, includ-
ing a renewed commitment to full employment"128
If the purpose of job training is to help social assistance recipients
into jobs, there must be jobs available. But not only must there be jobs
available, there must be jobs available which allow people to earn suf-
ficient income to meet their needs. Otherwise, the question remains:
What are we training people to do?
CONCLUSION:
THE IMPACT OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS
This paper has shown that there is a change in attitude towards wel-
fare recipients which may in fact reflect the origins of social assistance
as charity. Increased costs to government and the number of
"employable" persons on social assistance is also a part of this change
in attitude. As a result, the much touted War on Poverty has been
transformed into a War on the Poor.
While one would find few political allies in advocating that the
government not offer training programs, a review of training programs
in Canada and "work incentive" programs in the United States make
it clear that: (i) not all training programs are the same in terms of how
comprehensive they are, and (ii) the purpose of the programs will
greatly affect who the beneficiaries will be.
As there seems to be some indication that "opportunity planning" will
take place in Ontario, the concern for social assistance advocates
should be with the reasons the government is adopting this recom-
mendation. If it is being adopted as a way of reforming social assis-
tance without much capital outlay, social assistance advocates have
great cause for concern. Programs in the United States which were im-
plemented for this reason offered few, if any, support services and be-
came a way of simply moving people off social assistance. However, if
the reason is to improve the employment opportunities for those on
social assistance, it is imperative to remind the government that social
assistance recipients are not a homogeneous group of people. While
sole-support parents and handicapped persons will be exempted from
the requirement to enter into opportunity planning, those who are re-
quired to enter the program will still require support services. Further-
128. Social Planning Council Submission, supra, note 86 at 31.
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more, it should be a responsibility of the government to offer
programs with child care for sole support parents and accessibility for
the disabled so they will not be excluded from volunteering for train-
ing programs.
As training programs currently available already have waiting lists, the
government should implement "opportunity planning" on a voluntary
basis. If training programs are effective and perceived as effective in
helping persons move into the workforce, there is every indication that
people will volunteer to enter them. Creating a bureaucracy to enforce
this condition on social assistance should only happen if the govern-
ment is able to show that is has offered effective programs which are
being under-utilized. Given the current waiting lists and the lack of
capital now available for training programs, this is not likely to hap-
pen for some time.
Training can easily turn into a punitive exercise. This must be avoided
so as to afford social assistance recipients with proper training
programs which may enable them to move into the workforce. This of
course accepts the assumption that theie will be jobs for people to
move into; an assumption which should also be challenged.
